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COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Forty-sixth session

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 10th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 5 February 1990, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mrs. REGAZZOLI (Argentina)

later: Mrs. QUISUMBING (Philippines)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, INCLUDING PALESTINE (agenda item 4) (continued) (E/CN.4/1990/3, 4 and 59; A/44/352 and 599)

THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND ITS APPLICATION TO PEOPLES UNDER COLONIAL OR ALIEN DOMINATION OR FOREIGN OCCUPATION (agenda item 9) (continued) (E/CN.4/1990/10, 11 and 58; E/CN.4/1990/NGO/4 and 8; A/44/526)

1. Mr. KAID (Latin American Federation of Associations of Relatives of Disappeared Detainees) said that a number of delegations had expressed the hope that a fair and lasting solution would soon be reached to the conflict in the Western Sahara, a hope that was shared by the peoples of the region. Fourteen years of violent fighting had taken a heavy toll of human lives and economic resources, in addition to which the continuation of the conflict placed a hurdle in the path of any regional integration project. The past 14 years of conflict merely confirmed the absurdity of any military solution, an awareness that had incited the two parties in the conflict, Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO, to seek a peaceful solution.

2. Thus, a good-offices process had begun under the auspices of the United Nations and in co-operation with OAS, with the agreement of both parties to the conflict, and a peace plan had been prepared on the basis of OAS resolution AHG/Res.104 and General Assembly resolution 40/50, which provided for the organization of a referendum on self-determination and the initiation of direct negotiations between the parties to decide upon the manner in which the referendum was to be organized. The meeting at Marrakesh on 4 and 5 January 1989 between the King of Morocco and a delegation of the Frente POLISARIO was thought to herald a fair and peaceful solution to the conflict. The Frente POLISARIO desired to galvanize the peace process and had not only unilaterally decreed periods of truce in the conflict, but had also considerably diminished the scale of its military actions. In addition, on 10 May 1989 it had decided to free 200 Moroccan prisoners of war.

3. Unfortunately, far from matching that peaceful gesture, Morocco remained intransigent. Not only had it failed to keep its commitment to continue the nascent dialogue, and postponed the planned second meeting several times, it had also refused the repatriation of the 200 freed prisoners, despite the proposals by the International Committee of the Red Cross. Furthermore, since his most recent trip to Spain, the King of Morocco had negotiated the purchase of huge quantities of military equipment.

4. Since the beginning of the conflict, the Saharans living in the occupied territories had been subjected to mass arrests carried out without distinction as to sex or age. Currently more than 850 Saharan civilians had been reported as missing, many of them for as long as 14 years. Hundreds of families lived in a state of anxiety, as they had heard nothing about their loved ones since they had disappeared. All the arrests had been carried out without warrants, and frequently in the middle of the night. Anyone who dared to inquire about the fate of a detained relative was threatened with the same fate, thereby making it impossible to resort to any form of defence. None of the missing persons had ever been brought before the courts accused of any crime or even on account of convictions, and the only crime of which they were accused was that of remaining attached to their customs.

5. In the occupied areas of Western Sahara, systematic human rights violations by the Moroccan authorities were commonplace: since the end of 1988, more than 6,000 young Saharans had been compelled to leave their homes and families and had been deported to towns inside Morocco. They were compelled to begin a new life in a totally alien society where, far from their families and rootless, they ran the risk of sinking into the consumption of hashish and into other vices unknown in their traditional society. Rather than accept assimilation, many of them had preferred to run the risk of crossing a closely guarded frontier. Hundreds of them had succeeded in eluding the vigilance of the frontier guards, although others had been caught and brutally treated.

6. At its most recent session, the General Assembly had adopted a resolution in which it requested the two parties in the conflict to renew the dialogue in order to achieve a fair and peaceful solution. The Secretary-General of the United Nations had met the two parties separately and had introduced to them the new Special Representative for Western Sahara. Those new initiatives had rekindled hope, and that hope should not be disappointed.

7. Mr. WUJOHTSANG (Minority Rights Group) commended the Dalai Lama on his peaceful work on behalf of the self-determination of the people of Tibet, for which he had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The right of peoples to self-determination was a fundamental principle firmly entrenched in the international human rights standards, and was the first right set out in the two International Covenants on Human Rights. Self-determination was a right of "peoples", and the term "people" was more than a mere ethnic, social, religious or cultural concept. Peoples possessed a homeland, or had the right to possess one. An examination of the criteria establishing the right to self-determination left no doubt as far as the Tibetan people were concerned.

8. The right to self-determination had always been applied to peoples who could not exercise control over their territory on account of foreign or colonial domination. Pursuant to that definition, the Tibetan people had a right to self-determination, as it had been subjected to foreign colonial domination since China's invasion and annexation of Tibet in 1950. Prior to the invasion, Tibet had long been an independent country, as evidence had been found of treaties signed as early as 705 AD between Tibet and China. In spite of challenges, and even an invasion, Tibet had always managed to preserve its independence, and had been an independent State in all respects until the invasion by the Chinese People's Liberation Army in 1949. However, as the international community, and in particular the United Nations, had not come to its help, the Tibetan Government had been forced by the overwhelming superiority of the invader's army to accept the Chinese demands. A Tibetan Government delegation had been compelled to visit Beijing in 1951 to sign the "17-point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet".

9. Subsequently, Chinese troops had gradually occupied the country, but foreign occupation could never give rise to legitimate sovereignty, and the continued presence of China served as a constant reminder of the violation of the Tibetan people's right to self-determination. Following the brutal repression of the 1959 popular uprising in Llasa, the Tibetan Government leaders had fled to India, where they had repudiated the "17-point Agreement", and thus reaffirmed Tibet's sovereignty. The continued occupation of Tibet by Chinese forces constituted a manifest violation of the principle of self-determination.

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10. In its resolutions 1353 (XIV) of 1959, 1723 (XVI) of 1961 and 2079 (XX) of 1965, the General Assembly had recognized the ominous nature of China's intentions in Tibet, called on China to refrain from attacking the culture, religious and national heritage of the Tibetan people and found that, by its action, China was violating the principle of self-determination. In 1959 and 1960, the International Commission of Jurists had accused China of acts of genocide in Tibet, and had reported the murder of religious leaders and others, the mass deportation of Tibetan children, forced sterilization of Tibetan women, the banning of cultural activities and a systematic programme to eliminate Tibetan religion and culture.

11. The time had come for Tibet to exercise its right to self-determination, so as to put an end to the sustained and consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights that had characterized China's presence in the country. The intransigence shown by the Chinese authorities, who refused to protect the cultural and religious values of Tibetans, and who were seriously undermining their civil, political, social and economic rights, deprived China of any semblance of sovereignty it might have been able to claim after 40 consecutive years of control over Tibet. China was either unwilling or unable to ensure the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of Tibetans, and it was clear that the only means of guaranteeing the rights of Tibetans was to allow them to exercise without hindrance their right to self-determination.

12. The continued presence of the Chinese army in Tibet was a further reason for recognizing the Tibetans' right to self-determination. It was a fundamental principle that humanitarian law applied whenever a territory was controlled by military force, even if there appeared to be no armed resistance. The rights of persons living in occupied territories were not extinguished by annexation. Although humanitarian law was applicable to Tibet, the Chinese authorities had carried out forced resettlement of many Tibetans and had transferred part of their own civilian population to Tibet, in contravention of article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The reports of United Nations special rapporteurs and articles published in the world press had quoted allegations of summary and arbitrary executions by the authorities in Tibet, as well as the torture of political prisoners, in order to obtain confessions or as a punishment.

13. Whatever real or alleged difficulties might arise from the exercise by the Tibetans of their inalienable right to self-determination, the international community was duty-bound to guarantee the enjoyment of human rights for all, including the Tibetans. At its forty-fourth session, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 44/79, on the universal realization of the right to peoples to self-determination, and recent events in Eastern Europe showed that it was possible to bring about peaceful change. There could be no better moment to attempt to remedy a regrettable oversight that had, in recent decades, caused so much suffering for 6 million people.

14. The Dalai Lama had always insisted upon non-violent methods. In support of his appeal, and as an example, the Minority Rights Group requested the Commission to call on the People's Republic of China to forego bloodshed and to take practical steps to allow the Tibetans fully to exercise their right to self-determination without foreign interference.

15. Mr. COMTE (Centre Europe-Tiers Monde (CETIM)) said that his organization, was deeply concerned about the situation in Eritrea, where war was still raging and civilians continued to suffer considerable human rights violations and were again feeling the scourge of famine, despite the opening of negotiations between the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Ethiopian Government. The parties had agreed to invite seven observers, but when the Ethiopian Government had learned that EPLF had chosen OAS and the United Nations, it had done all in its power to prevent the United Nations from participating as an observer. That unacceptable attitude suggested that the Ethiopian Government's only aim was to gain time, in particular as it had constantly refused to discuss with EPLF the joint measures urgently required to alleviate the suffering of the victims of a new famine. In addition, at the beginning of January, Ethiopian troops had attacked a humanitarian convoy made up of lorries of the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA) and, subsequently, the Ethiopian air force had systematically bombed the road network used by the ERA lorries. For its part, EPLF had unilaterally decided to free, on 31 December 1989, the more than 10,000 Ethiopian prisoners of war it held.

16. Eritrea was a product of colonization. It had first of all been an Italian colony from 1889 to 1941 when it had come under British administration until 1952. In 1950 it had been compelled by General Assembly resolution 390 (V) to enter a federation with Ethiopia, contrary to the wishes of the Eritrean people and the Charter. In 1962, Emperor Haile Selassie had abrogated the federation and annexed Eritrea to Ethiopia, thus flouting the United Nations decisions. The Eritrean people's claim to self-determination was, however, in accordance with United Nations law and practice. General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), adopted in 1960, recognized that the right to self-determination was a fundamental human right and a prerequisite for the realization of all human rights, as well as for peace and development. General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), adopted in 1970, reasserted that all peoples had the right freely to determine, without external interference their political status. The Eritrean people's status as a people had been internationally recognized, in particular by the United Nations, in resolution 390 (V) of 1950. Politically speaking, the Eritrean people had given proof of its existence by its continuous resistance, for over 29 years, and at the cost of heavy sacrifice. As a colonial people that had passed from one form of domination to another, from Italian and British domination to Ethiopian domination, it had been prevented from defining its international status.

17. It was not true that Eritrea's fate had been decided once and for all in 1950. At that time, the United Nations had intervened solely to offset the inability of the major Powers to agree on the future of Eritrea. Accordingly, it should return to the question of the genuine decolonization of that country, within the new legal context created by the establishment of the right of peoples to self-determination. The only way of settling the Eritrean question was thus to allow the Eritreans to exercise their right to self-determination. As early as 1980, EPLF had proposed that a referendum be held in Eritrea under United Nations auspices, but the Ethiopian Government had always rejected that proposal. Accordingly, CETIM called upon the Commission on Human Rights to adopt a resolution on Eritrea in order first of all, to ask the Ethiopian Government to end immediately all human rights violations against Eritrean and Ethiopian civilians and to begin serious

negotiations to reach a fair and peaceful solution to the problem of Eritrea and secondly, to adopt, as rapidly as possible, the measures necessary for the United Nations to take part in the peace process and act as an observer.

18. Mr. ISSINGHE (Pax Romana) said that his organization was particularly concerned about the situation of all those who did not attract media attention and who were not included in the cares of Governments and institutionalized authorities. In terms of peoples still combating colonial occupation, it was particularly worried about the people of East Timor, whence came disturbing reports of violations of the most basic rights. If the situation there had not improved in spite of all the promises made by the Government of Indonesia, it was because the latter categorically refused to tackle the issue of self-determination, which lay at the root of all the other problems.

19. The "opening" of the territory in January 1989, for domestic economic reasons, but which Indonesia had sought to use to its diplomatic advantage, had not brought the expected benefits. Ease of access was still not complete, and there were still large areas of the territory which it was impossible to visit. Journeys were made exclusively along roads subject to systematic military checks. The extremely limited visit of His Holiness the Pope to East Timor, in October 1989, had been preceded and followed by repressive measures, in particular against young people who had demonstrated on behalf of independence. After their arrest they had been subjected to torture in order to compel them to accuse a priest of having organized the demonstrations. Some of those young people were still missing. Other young Timorese who had taken refuge in the Bishop's House had been arrested and ill-treated.

20. On 17 January 1990, the Indonesian armed forces had brutally maltreated some 100 young people who had previously talked for about an hour with the United States Ambassador to Jakarta, and some witnesses had stated that a number of people had died, an assertion that was confirmed by the Indonesian Institute for the Defence of Human Rights. Persons aged between 17 and 21 were increasingly the victims of repression, which showed that Indonesia had failed to transform young Timorese into Indonesians by imposing its rules and education system.

21. Following the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of resolution 37/30 in 1982, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities had requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to encourage the administering Power, the Indonesian Government and representatives of the Timorese people to co-operate in order to achieve a durable solution, taking full account of the rights and wishes of the people of East Timor. Some 15 years after the unlawful invasion of their country by the Indonesian armed forces, the Timorese people still craved for peace, and the leader of the Timorese resistance had stated that his movement would unhesitatingly submit itself to the freely expressed will of the people. The paths to peace were thus open. The onus was upon Indonesia and the international community to contribute towards a fair solution, in accordance with the international law for which Governments asserted their respect.

22. Mr. TEITELBAUM (American Association of Jurists) said that the principle of non-intervention and respect for the right to self-determination had recently suffered a flagrant violation on the American continent, with the invasion of the Republic of Panama by the United States. The reasons invoked by the United States Government to justify that invasion did not stand up on

examination. It would be naive to believe that the operation had been designed to strike a mortal blow at the drug traffic by capturing Noriega and restoring democracy, when in fact it merely added to the long list of United States interventions against the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean. More than 100 such acts had taken place between the annexation of half of the territory of Mexico in 1848 and the invasion of Granada in 1983, including the numerous interventions in Haiti, Nicaragua, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, El Salvador, Cuba, Panama, Mexico and Chile. The pretext was nearly always the same: protection of United States property and citizens, and the consequences were always detrimental to the enjoyment of human rights in the countries concerned.

23. The invasion of Panama had a clearly defined objective, the renegotiation of the 1977 Torrijos-Carter Treaty with a docile Panamanian Government, in order to extend United States military presence in Panama beyond the year 2000.

24. The militarization of the canal zone had long been justified by the need to protect that seaway in case of war. However, a simple glance at a map of the region showed that the United States military bases in Panama, together with the mobile units of the Eighth Army, the special forces trained in anti-insurgency operations, the advisers and instructors and the sophisticated electronic systems in fact constituted the operational centre for United States intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean and were a means of fomenting regional conflicts, otherwise known as low-intensity conflicts or limited wars.

25. The American Association of Jurists considered that the international community was duty-bound to intervene, by virtue of the Charter of the United Nations and the international declarations, covenants and treaties, whenever human rights and the rights of peoples were violated in any country. However, it firmly rejected unilateral interference by any country whatsoever, even in the name of democracy or the struggle against the drug traffic, because what was really involved was a thinly disguised version of the "big stick policy". Furthermore, the principles of the people's sovereignty and national sovereignty were inseparable, and both formed part of the right of peoples to self-determination.

26. It defied the common sense and the historical experience of the peoples of Latin America to assert that a foreign army of occupation, whose men did not even speak the language of the country occupied, could guarantee the restoration of self-determination to the people. The invasion of Panama had led to the almost complete destruction of a low-income district of 80 blocks, El Chorrillo, by the bombs and rockets of the United States Air Force, and had caused large numbers of civilian victims. The occupying troops had unlawfully arrested thousands of civilians and military personnel, carried out brutal searches of private homes and trade union premises, invaded the residence of the Ambassador of Nicaragua and brought enormous pressure to bear on the Papal Nuncio's residence to obtain Noriega's surrender.

27. The right of intervention, of dubious legality, which the United States had reserved for itself in the amendments made by the United States Senate to the Torrijos-Carter Treaties was, in any case, restricted to circumstances in which the normal operation of the canal was threatened, and that had not been the case. The invasion of Panama was a clear breach of the preamble to Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations and of article 1 common to the

two international covenants on human rights. (Although the latter had not been ratified by the United States, they formed part of the set of intangible rights that all States should respect.) The acts committed by the United States army constituted violations of article 14, paragraph 1, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - which enshrined the right to asylum - and of the 1928, 1933 and 1954 American Conventions on Asylum, which had not been ratified by the United States, but of which Panama was a signatory. The United States army had also breached the rules of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, ratified by Panama in 1963 and by the United States in 1972, and in particular the articles concerning the freedom of movement of diplomats and the immunity of their persons and residences.

28. With those considerations in mind, the American Association of Jurists proposed that the Commission on Human Rights, following the example of the Organization of American States, the United Nations General Assembly and the European Parliament, should condemn the invasion of Panama and the other acts committed in violation of international law by the occupying troops, should invite the Government of the United States to withdraw its occupying forces forthwith and compensate the Panamanian State and people, and, in response to the invitation extended by Panama, should appoint a group of members of the Commission to carry out an on-the-spot examination of the human rights situation in that country.

29. Mr. WALDEN (Observer for Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that his indictment of the one-sided nature of the debate had been tragically confirmed the previous day by the terrorist attack against a bus carrying tourists of Israeli and other nationalities, in the region of Ismailia, in Egypt. Nine Israelis and two Egyptians had reportedly been killed and virtually all the other passengers wounded, some of them seriously. Responsibility for the attack had already been claimed by a terrorist group, and the Government of Egypt was undoubtedly doing all in its power to track down those responsible.

30. In fact, however, the precise identity of the perpetrators of the crime made no difference, as it was a clear expression of that same one-sided fanaticism that had already assumed protean forms even before the establishment of the State of Israel. Whether it was the PLO, the Hamas or Abu Nidal groups, the objective was always the same: to kill the Israelis, to kill the Jews. His delegation was by no means surprised at the indifference shown by the Commission, none of whose members had expressed the slightest regret on that occasion: it had come to expect nothing less from a body that was so openly partisan and selective in the concern it voiced for human rights.

31. There was no need for his delegation to reply to the statements made: the murderers in Ismailia had provided a far more effective answer. That was what the conflict in the Middle East was all about: when the Arab world had learned to accept Israel's presence, it would be easy to resolve all the difficulties, although the crime in Ismailia was a further reminder of how far away that moment was.

32. Mr. VARGAS (Observer for Nicaragua), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the representative of Panama apparently no longer entirely approved of the invasion of his country by the United States occupation troops. The representative of the United States had denied that there were

concentration camps in Panama, whereas the Panamanian representative had acknowledged their existence at the previous meeting, although he had added that they were about to be closed and had described them in idyllic terms.

33. It should be remembered, in that connection, that the occupying army controlled the entire country and that it was impossible to contact any organization capable of providing an assessment of the losses caused by the invasion. The exact number of dead, wounded and missing was kept secret and did not appear in any of the manifestly false reports published. Families had not been informed about the existence of mass graves and concentration camps and were not allowed to visit them, although their existence had been recognized by the representative of Panama himself and by the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers of the ICFTU, which had protested against the human rights violations committed by the United States army of occupation.

34. It was particularly disturbing that, in an occupied country like Panama, the Government was unable to guarantee respect for the fundamental rights of citizens against unlawful foreign intervention. Press photographs showed Panamanian dead, including persons who had died in the camps. In particular, a photograph had been published of a journalist murdered by the United States army in an area where there had been no resistance and which had been spared the violence. Some sources also reported human rights violations by the United States occupation troops against foreign diplomats, in violation of the Vienna Convention and the elementary rules of international law.

35. An attempt to justify the intervention was in itself an unjustifiable exercise. It should not be forgotten that Noriega was a former United States agent, just as Trujillo, Somoza or Batista had been, and that he had merely ceased to be useful.

36. Lastly, he quoted article 270 of the 1972 Panamanian Constitution, as amended in 1980 and 1983, which set out the obligation for all Panamanians to take up arms to defend the independence and territorial integrity of the nation. There was every likelihood that, in spite of any amendments that had been made, the Panamanian Constitution still included an article of that kind, since it was perfectly normal for States to condemn as a traitor to his country any citizen who facilitated foreign intervention.

37. Mr. JAZIC (Yugoslavia), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said he was most surprised that Pax Christi had deemed it appropriate to mention Yugoslavia in connection with agenda item 9. The accusation was a groundless one, as Kosovo, most of whose population was of Albanian origin, was an autonomous province of the Republic of Serbia within the Yugoslav Federation. Accordingly, its inhabitants enjoyed all human rights and fundamental freedoms, and suffered no form of discrimination. The current disturbances in that region were aimed at undermining national sovereignty and integrity at a time when extensive democratic reforms were under way. No Government in the world would accept a threat to its territorial integrity or foreign interference without adopting immediate measures to maintain public order.

38. Mr. ZHANG Yishan (China), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that, in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations and of the principles of international law, certain people had for some time been making use of international forums to interfere in the domestic affairs of other

countries under the pretext of protecting human rights. On that very same day, some representatives of non-governmental organizations had not hesitated to refer to the autonomous region of Tibet as if it were a State and to claim on its behalf a right to self-determination. In order to keep the meeting on a serious footing, it was necessary for his delegation to recall some historical facts.

39. In the first place, while the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination dated from the beginning of the century, it had been asserted in particular at the time of the Second World War, following which it had acquired a specific connotation as referring to the right of oppressed peoples to free themselves from imperialist and colonialist régimes and establish independent countries. Tibet had been an inseparable part of Chinese territory since the thirteenth century and, over those 700 years, successive central Governments had all exercised effective sovereignty over that area, which was currently an autonomous region, i.e. an administrative division analogous to a province, and an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China. Preaching Tibet's right to self-determination was tantamount to inciting it to become independent or in other words, trying to dismember the territory of a Member State by taking advantage of the work of a United Nations human rights forum. That was nothing but a wanton interference in the internal affairs of a country.

40. As early as the beginning of the century, there were people attempting to separate Tibet from China and turn it into their appendage, but their plot had failed. Despite the collapse of imperialism and colonialism, some colonialist ideas still remained deeply rooted in the minds of a few people. Certain NGOs were merely repeating a colonialist cliché, failing to realize that time was passing and that it was impossible to put the clock back. What the old colonialists had failed to achieve through tyranny could not be achieved by colonialist elements on the eve of the twenty-first century.

41. Tibet's modern history, as presented to the Commission by certain persons, was a pure fabrication, a figment of the imagination of some Tibetan separatists. The democratic reform introduced in Tibet in 1959 by the Central Government and the abolition of feudal serfdom had made it possible for the former serfs to take their destiny into their own hands and become the masters. It was the first time that those men and women had truly enjoyed fundamental human rights, guaranteed by the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. In any event, it was unlikely that the opinions of short-sighted NGOs would be echoed by delegations with a sincere concern for human rights.

42. Mr. LE LUONG MINH (Observer for Viet Nam), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said he had three observations to make on the statement by Pax Christi. His delegation was in favour of that NGO's suggestion that the Cambodian seat at the United Nations be left vacant, that the genocide committed by the Khmers Rouges be condemned and that all military aid to all the parties involved in the conflict be halted. The implementation of those propositions, which had long since been advocated by Viet Nam, would make it much easier to resolve the Cambodian problem. His delegation reaffirmed that, if the United Nations adopted the attitude that stemmed from the vacation of Cambodia's United Nations seat, the situation would be transformed. He also confirmed that all Vietnamese troops had indeed been evacuated from Cambodia by 26 September 1989.

43. Mr. PEREIRA GOMES (Portugal), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the remarks made at the previous meeting by the Indonesian delegation required a brief comment by his own delegation. The remarks made by that delegation were contradictory since, on the one hand, it asserted that it did not wish to become involved in an irrelevant argument and, on the other, it raised controversial matters that had no connection with the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination.

44. The issue was not the 400 years of Portuguese colonization, but the question whether or not the people of East Timor had exercised its right to self-determination. It was clear from a number of resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly that the people of East Timor had been prevented from exercising that right by the Indonesian invasion of December 1975, and that it had subsequently been prevented from expressing itself by tight military control.

45. Portugal had begun the process of decolonization after the April 1974 Revolution, as in the case in all of its colonies, and it was during that process that the Indonesian Government had decided to invade the territory.

46. His delegation did not wish to refer to the various press articles describing the gross violations of human rights of which the people of East Timor were unfortunately the daily victims. It would limit itself to recalling that, in a resolution dated August 1989, the Sub-Commission had expressed the hope that the Indonesian Government would allow the representatives of human rights organizations to visit the territory, which had not so far been the case. If it was so proud of its achievements in the sphere of human rights, there was no reason why the Indonesian Government should refuse that request, which would make it possible to obtain a clearer idea of the real situation in East Timor.

47. Mr. ALDORI (Iraq), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the International Federation for Human Rights, which had made a statement on the subject of the Kurdish question, should study more closely the issue of self-determination within the framework of international law, as the observations it had made were irrelevant to the matter under consideration. Furthermore, the representative of that NGO appeared to be totally ignorant of the actual facts as far as the Iraqi Kurds were concerned. His delegation was able to assure the Federation that Iraqi Kurds enjoyed all the legally recognized rights, not only in Kurdistan but throughout the whole of Iraqi territory, on the same footing as all other citizens. The Federation had fallen into the trap of relying on erroneous information, and had thus lost some of its credibility, but his delegation was ready to provide it with any information it might require on the precise circumstances of the Kurds in the cultural, economic and political spheres.

48. Mr. ALEMU (Ethiopia), speaking in exercise of the right of reply to three non-governmental organizations whose statements had apparently had no other objective than to tarnish Ethiopia's image, said that for a number of years, at virtually every session, the International League for the Rights and Liberation of Peoples, the International Organization for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Centre Europe-Tiers Monde had been relentlessly launching accusations and polemical salvoes designed to embellish the image of opposition groups in Ethiopia. In so doing, they were totally

oblivious to what was actually happening on the ground, and confined themselves to one unchanging script, merely changing the order of its paragraphs. An analysis of their statements revealed that they were nothing but paraphrases of texts and tracts distributed by opposition groups. It might have been expected that, in view of the peace negotiations under way and embarrassment at the acts of piracy committed in the Red Sea against ships laden with relief food supplies by the very same people on whose behalf they had demonstrated such visceral hostility towards Ethiopia, the organizations concerned might, at the current session, have slightly altered their stance. That was too much to hope, however, as those organizations were totally subservient to the opposition groups concerned and had not changed a single detail of their script (let alone taken into account the good will of the Government of Ethiopia and its efforts to solve its domestic problems peacefully). The question arose when or whether those groups would decide to make a contribution, however small it might be, to the search for peace and for an improved political climate in a region which needed it so much.

49. His Government had the greatest respect for the role played by the NGOs in promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, and had even benefited from their activities, but the three organizations in question did not deserve their consultative status as they had clearly decided to make a mockery of their responsibilities. Nevertheless, it was to be hoped that as a result of the improved international climate, some of them would no longer have the opportunity to peddle the tragedies of peoples and nations.

50. Mr. ELARABY (Observer for Egypt), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that his Government had already informed the Government of Israel of its deep regret at the criminal act perpetrated on 4 February 1990 in the vicinity of Ismailia, of which a number of civilians, both Israeli and Egyptian, had been the victims. In its official communiqué, the Arab Republic of Egypt had condemned the barbarous attack against Israeli tourists, the main objective of which had been to hinder the efforts under way to further the peace process in the region, and had asserted its determination to protect all persons on its territory. That isolated crime could not, however, be invoked as a justification for the serious and daily human rights violations that affected the population of the territories occupied by Israel. Two distinct issues were involved, the first of which bore no connection with the agenda item under review.

51. Mr. NGO Hac Team (Observer for Cambodia), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the arrogant remarks of the representative of Viet Nam flouted the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the resolutions adopted by the United Nations subsequent to the aggression against Cambodia by Viet Nam. Under international law, Viet Nam had no right to interfere in the affairs of its neighbouring countries, still less to attack Cambodia and Laos and install a Stalinist régime in Phnom Penh. It was strange that Viet Nam persisted in supporting the puppet Government in Phnom Penh and refused to implement the five-point peace plan proposed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk. In fact, disguised Vietnamese troops were still present in Cambodia and were engaged in daily fighting with the resistance.

52. Viet Nam was totally unjustified in questioning the legitimacy of the delegation of Cambodia to the United Nations. That legitimacy was recognized by the international community, as had been confirmed by the refusal of the General Assembly's Credentials Committee to consider the matter.

53. Mr. LE LUONG MINH (Observer for Viet Nam), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that a person representing the Pol Pot régime, responsible for the massacre of 3 million Cambodians, had no right to speak before the Commission on Human Rights.

54. Mr. NGO Hac Team (Observer for Cambodia), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that it was the Vietnamese leaders and their puppets in Phnom Penh who were currently massacring the Cambodian people. Cambodians were entitled to combat all aggressors, who themselves had but one right, the right to leave Cambodia.

VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: REPORT OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS (agenda item 5) (E/CN.4/1990/6 and 7)

THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF POLITICAL, MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE GIVEN TO THE COLONIAL AND RACIST REGIME IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (agenda item 6) (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/9 and Corr.1 and Add.1)

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SUPRESSION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF APARTHEID (agenda item 15) (E/CN.4/1990/32 and Add.1 to 6, E/CN.4/1990/34 and Add.1 and 2, E/CN.4/1989/31/Add.10, E/CN.4/1989/33 and E/CN/4/1990/35)

STUDY IN COLLABORATION WITH THE SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES OF WAYS AND MEANS OF ENSURING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS BEARING ON APARTHEID, RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (agenda item 16 (a))

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAMME OF ACTION FOR THE SECOND DECADE TO COMBAT RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (agenda item 16 (b))

(E/CN.4/1990/37, 38 and 50; E/CN.4/1990/NGO/7; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/8 and Add.1)

55. Mr. MARTENSON (Under-Secretary-General for Human Rights), introducing agenda item 5, recalled that the Ad hoc Working Group of Experts on Southern Africa, composed of six independent experts, had been established in 1967 by Commission on Human Rights resolution 2 (XXIII). Pursuant to the mandate with which it had been entrusted by the Commission at its forty-fifth session by resolution 1989/5, the Group had succeeded in assembling direct information based on oral statements or on written communications transmitted by individuals or organizations. In particular, during a mission to London with Mr. Amos Wako, the Special Rapporteur on summary and arbitrary executions from 14 to 18 August 1989, the Working Group had gathered some extremely important information on policies or practices violating human rights in South Africa and Namibia.

56. In South Africa, despite some new and encouraging developments, repression had in many respects intensified, particularly since 9 June 1989 when the state of emergency had been extended for the fifth time. However, there had been some recent positive developments in Namibia, and the Working Group recommended that the future Government of Namibia should be afforded all the necessary assistance to strengthen institutions responsible for ensuring observance and promotion of human rights. In accordance with the request made by the Commission in resolution 1989/3, the Working Group would undertake a

further fact-finding mission to Namibia from 12 to 17 February 1990, after which it would submit to the Commission an addendum to its interim report (E/CN.4/1990/7). He also drew the attention of the members of the Commission to the report of the Secretary-General on torture and inhuman treatment of children in detention in South Africa and Namibia (E/CN.4/1990/6), which constituted a useful complement to the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on that issue (A/44/623).

57. Introducing agenda item 6, he said that the subject of that item had been regularly examined for many years. At its forty-fifth session, in resolution 1989/7, the Commission had expressed its appreciation to Mr. Ahmed Khalifa, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on that topic, for his report and, in resolution 1989/6, it had recommended that he be invited to continue to update the list of banks, transnational corporations and other organizations assisting the racist régime of South Africa. As the Commission's recommendations had been approved by the Economic and Social Council (resolution 1989/23), the Special Rapporteur had submitted to the Sub-Commission, at its forty-first session, his updated report (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/9 and Corr.1 and Add.1), which was currently before the Commission.

58. Introducing agenda item 15, he recalled that, after the entry into force on 18 July 1976 of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, which had so far been ratified or acceded to by 88 States, a working group consisting of three members of the Commission had been established to examine the periodic reports submitted by States parties pursuant to article VII of the Convention. At its first session, in 1978, the Group of Three had drawn up general guidelines regarding the form and content of those reports. At its forty-fifth session the Commission had decided, by resolution 1989/8, that States parties should continue to submit their initial reports not later than two years after the entry into force of the Convention for the States parties concerned and their subsequent periodic reports at four-year intervals, on the understanding that they might submit additional information to the Group at any time in the intervening period if they wished to do so. The Group of Three had so far considered 125 reports, submitted by 53 States parties, and had made a number of recommendations regarding the measures to be adopted for the implementation of the Convention. In that connection, he pointed out that, on 31 December 1989, more than 190 reports due from States parties had not yet been submitted, and that 33 States parties had yet to submit their initial reports, which, in some cases, were more than 10 years overdue. He drew the Commission's attention to resolution 44/69, adopted by the General Assembly at its most recent session, on the status of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, which contained a number of requests addressed to the Commission.

59. Under agenda item 15, the Commission had before it a note by the Secretary-General concerning the status of the Convention and the submission of reports by States parties (E/CN.4/1990/32 and addenda), as well as the report by the Group of Three on its 1990 session (E/CN.4/1990/35).

60. Agenda item 16 concerned one of the most crucial issues facing the international community, and one of the areas of international life in which the Commission had a particularly important role to play. Racism and racial discrimination constituted fundamental denials of basic human dignity and

inevitably led to human rights violations. The struggle against racism and racial discrimination had been a corner-stone of the work of the Commission on Human Rights, which could justly take satisfaction in its record as the initiator and supervisor of many of the measures and instruments adopted to eliminate those two scourges.

61. A broad programme of activities, supplemented by detailed plans of action for the periods 1985-1989 and 1990-1993, had been prepared within the framework of the Second Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, proclaimed by the General Assembly in 1983. As Co-ordinator of the Programme of Action of the Second Decade, he had given particular priority to the establishment of better contact among the various United Nations organs and organizations, in order to multiply the effects of their individual actions. With that in mind, he had raised the issue of the implementation of the objectives of the Second Decade in the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination.

62. Among the many activities organized during the past year by the Centre for Human Rights, and, within its field of competence, by the Centre against Apartheid, particular mention should be made of the Seminar on the Effects of Racism and Racial Discrimination on Social and Economic Relations between Indigenous Populations and States, organized by the Commission on Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council, and the International Seminar on Cultural Dialogue between the Countries of Origin and the Host Countries of Migrant Workers, held at Athens in September 1989, the report on which had been issued under symbol E/CN.4/1990/50. Pursuant to the request made by the Commission on Human Rights in its resolution 1988/16, it was also planned to organize at the beginning of the year, at Geneva, a seminar on "the political, historical, economic, social and cultural factors contributing to racism, racial discrimination and apartheid" as well as, throughout the year, numerous workshops and regional and national training courses in various regions of the world.

63. The World Public Information Campaign on Human Rights, launched by the General Assembly, was also designed to strengthen public information activities, which were a major area for the efforts undertaken to achieve the objectives of the Programme of Action of the Second Decade. He had himself adopted measures to strengthen activities in that sphere and had, in particular, established regular meetings with the media and non-governmental organizations in order to make the role of the United Nations in the combat against racism and racial discrimination better known.

64. The United Nations Centre against Apartheid had, for its part, organized an international NGO seminar on education against apartheid, held at Geneva in September 1989, in order to give international publicity to the current situation in South Africa under apartheid, to evaluate educational programmes and their impact on the international campaign against racism, apartheid and racial discrimination and to define new forms of education in support of that campaign. Moreover, the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations had organized, in September 1989 at Geneva, a public hearing on the activities of transnational corporations in South Africa and Namibia in order to review the current trends within transnational corporations in the perspective of efforts to dismantle the system of apartheid.

65. In spite of the recent events which suggested that a favourable evolution was taking place, the fight against apartheid remained of prime importance. The Centre for Human Rights intended to participate fully in international activities to eradicate racism and racial discrimination, and was prepared to make the most effective use of its resources to achieve that end.

66. Mrs. Quisumbing (Philippines) took the Chair.

67. Mr. BALANDA (Chairman-Rapporteur of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on southern Africa), introducing the interim report of the Ad Hoc Working Group (E/CN.4/1990/7), recalled that the Group had been set up by the Commission on Human Rights in 1967. The previous year, by its resolution 1989/5, the Commission had requested the Group to continue to investigate and study the policies and practices which violated human rights in South Africa and Namibia, as well as infringements of trade-union rights in South Africa, and to continue to investigate cases of torture and ill-treatment of detainees and deaths of detainees in South Africa. In that connection, he also drew the Commission's attention to the report on the detention and torture of children in South Africa and Namibia (E/CN.4/1990/6), in response to the request made by the Commission in resolution 1989/4. With regard to trade-union rights, he recalled that, on 1 June 1967, the Economic and Social Council had adopted a special procedure authorizing the Working Group to receive communications and hear witnesses in order to carry out its investigations. He further informed the Commission that pursuant to Commission resolution 1989/3, the Group was to undertake a mission to Namibia between 12 and 18 February 1990 and that the report on that mission would form the subject of an addendum to its interim report which the Commission would be able to consider in the course of the session.

68. The report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts (E/CN.4/1990/7) gave a detailed and as objective as possible a description of the prevailing situation in South Africa and Namibia until the beginning of December 1989. The most recent developments, such as the announcement of the release of Nelson Mandela and the legalization of the main black organizations, would be reflected in the final report to be submitted by the Group to the Commission in 1991, at its forty-seventh session.

69. The report comprised two parts, devoted to South Africa and Namibia respectively. As already stated, the second part would be completed by an addendum. The first part, on South Africa, comprised five chapters on protection of the right to life and physical integrity and the administration of justice, the various forms of apartheid, including Bantustanization and forced population removals, the right to education, to freedom of expression and movement and to health, the exercise of the right to work and the freedom of association of the black peoples and, finally, ill-treatment inflicted on children and adolescents. He recalled that the Working Group had been authorized by the Commission on Human Rights, at its forty-fifth session, to submit its report directly to the General Assembly also, on account of the wealth of information it contained and the particular manner in which South Africa disregarded human rights.

70. He then provided an overview of the comments made in the report (E/CN.4/1990/7). He stressed that, while the overall social and political environment had changed considerably in South Africa and Namibia, there had still been numerous human rights violations during the period covered by the

report (January-December 1989). In South Africa, it was necessary to draw attention to arbitrary or unexplained killings of political activists combating apartheid (paras. 29 to 36). The state of emergency, renewed on 9 June 1989, had led to an increased number of detentions of activists and opponents under the 1982 Internal Security Act. Paragraphs 38 to 57 of the report also described various restrictions on freedom of movement. Torture remained commonplace; the South African police had on occasions implicitly acknowledged its responsibility for torture by paying compensation to victims (paras. 31 and 66).

71. Political trials took place in a legal context marked, in particular, by the absence of an automatic right of appeal for persons convicted and colour-based discrimination as regarded both extenuating or aggravating circumstances and the application of the death penalty. Accused black persons frequently had court-appointed pro deo counsel chosen from among the least experienced or novice lawyers. The doctrine of "common purpose", pursuant to which all persons present when an incident took place were regarded as accessories, remained in force.

72. In paragraphs 109 to 141, the report described a number of practices under apartheid, including forced population removals pursuant to the new amendments to the Group Areas Act. In addition, the adoption of a draft amendment concerning squatters might, in the future, affect 9 million persons; under that amendment, only agricultural workers actually working were considered lawful residents; their dependants and retired persons would become unlawful residents. He further said that restrictions on freedom of expression and movement were described in paragraphs 142 to 165. Restriction on the right to work and the right of association, together with the reactions of the trade-union movements, were described in paragraphs 181 to 201. In particular, there was no longer any arbitration procedure before the labour courts in cases of dismissal.

73. Repression also affected children, who suffered torture and other ill-treatment, as indicated in the previous reports of the Ad hoc Working Group of Experts, particularly paragraphs 89 to 106 of the report issued under the symbol E/CN.4/1497. He emphasized that the detention of children further weakened the so-called "Bantu" educational system, seriously jeopardizing the future of South Africa's black population. Statistics alone were insufficient, although a number of indications on the topic were provided in paragraphs 211 to 229 of the report (E/CN.4/1990/7).

74. In Namibia, accession to national sovereignty on 20 March 1990, as decided by the Constituent Assembly, would put an end to apartheid, to Bantustanization and to the export of South African legislation. However, the United Nations should not lose interest in Namibia and the Ad hoc Working Group of Experts had thus put forward a number of recommendations in its report. The Working Group was convinced of the vital need for the relevant United Nations organs and the entire international community to devote greater attention to the mechanisms required by an independent Namibia to ensure the enjoyment of human rights without discrimination. He again mentioned that the part of the Group's report on Namibia would be completed by an addendum, subsequent to the on-the-spot fact-finding mission.

75. The CHAIRMAN, speaking on behalf of the Commission, thanked the Chairman-Rapporteur and members of the Ad hoc Working Group of Experts on southern Africa.

76. Mr. VASSILENKO (Chairman-Rapporteur of the Group of Three members of the Commission), introducing the report of the Group, which had been set up pursuant to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, said that, during the period covered by its most recent report (E/CN.4/1990/35), the Group of Three had considered the reports submitted by seven States parties pursuant to article VII of the Convention (Bahamas, Burundi, India, China, Pakistan, Philippines and Czechoslovakia). Furthermore it had considered, in the light of the views expressed by the States parties, the importance and nature of the role played by transnational corporations in maintaining apartheid in South Africa, pursuant to Commission resolution 1989/8. The Group had noted that the States parties that had submitted reports had complied with their commitments under the Convention.

77. In part V of its report, the Group of Three set out conclusions and recommendations. It reasserted the utility of the reports by States parties to the Convention, and noted with concern that 33 States parties had yet to submit their initial reports. Accordingly, it urged all States parties to fulfil that obligation under the Convention. Moreover, the Group regretted that only 88 States had become parties, and asked the Commission to urge all States which had not yet done so to ratify or to accede to the Convention, in particular those States which had jurisdiction over transnational corporations operating in South Africa.

78. He recalled that, pursuant to resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Commission, transnational corporations operating in South Africa were considered as the accomplices of apartheid and liable to criminal prosecution on that count. The Group of Three appealed to all States to implement those resolutions. He furthermore drew the attention of the Commission to a previous proposal of one of its members for it to suggest guidelines to States for the formulation of legislation to punish the participation of transnational corporations in maintaining apartheid.

79. In the light of the recent favourable developments in South Africa, He emphasized that it was necessary to make provision not only for sanctions against South Africa, but also for negotiations, based on the principles of peace and justice set out in the Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa, adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1989 (resolution S-16/1). He concluded by acknowledging that, in view of those changes, the most recent report by the Group of Three was somewhat different from the previous ones, but that it still contained detailed information to which the Commission's attention was drawn.

80. The CHAIRMAN, speaking on behalf of the Commission, thanked the Chairman-Rapporteur and the members of the Group of Three.

81. Mr. PHEKO (Pan Africanist Congress of Azania), commenting on the dynamic element of negotiations which had been introduced into the South African situation, said that the changes that had taken place were attributable to the determination of the African people, whom the racist colonialist régime had failed to cow, and also to the major role played by international economic

sanctions. The dispossessed people of Azania were grateful to all those countries that had implemented sanctions, and requested them to intensify them until the final objective was achieved.

82. The South African economy had already been deeply affected: the value of the Rand was at its lowest level ever, capital had fled and South Africa no longer appeared a safe place to invest. Mr. de Klerk and his national and international backers had recognized that it was necessary to rescue the South African economy, and to introduce so-called "reforms" to do so. Furthermore, Mr. de Klerk had recently congratulated South African exporters on their success in circumventing international trade sanctions (Financial Times, London, 27 October 1989). According to the figures published by the South African Reserve Bank, the volume of merchandise exports had risen by 7.3 per cent in 1988, and by 13.5 per cent during the first half of 1989.

83. He then commented on the minimum conditions for negotiation which, after having been rejected by the South African Foreign Minister, had been partly accepted by Mr. de Klerk (release of political prisoners, removal of troops from the townships, the lifting of the state of emergency, the lifting of bans on all proscribed political organizations and the cessation of all political trials and executions). He pointed out, however, that those conditions in no way shook the pillars of apartheid; they had already existed at the time of the 1960 Sharpeville Uprising, at a time when Africans could hardly be described as free. For its part, the PAC had demanded other conditions: universal suffrage and the redistribution of resources, and primarily of land. The rest would naturally fall into place.

84. It had to be recognized that Mr. de Klerk's recent declaration of 1 February was a step in the right direction, although it should not inspire euphoria. The release of prisoners convicted of political offences and described as "terrorists" was still excluded. He appealed to all countries that had some influence with South Africa to prevail on it not to exclude those prisoners, whose offences had arisen from apartheid. He furthermore emphasized that those whom Mr. de Klerk described as "terrorists" were entitled to the status of prisoners of war pursuant to the 1977 Geneva Protocol I and to General Assembly resolutions 2526 (XXIV) and 3314 (XXIX). In that connection, he noted that a white lecturer and researcher at the University of Witwatersrand had confirmed that PAC guerrillas confronted only de Klerk's army and police. He added that, while members of the PAC and ANC sentenced to life imprisonment had been released, there were nevertheless 3,000 political prisoners in South Africa, 287 of whom were awaiting execution.

85. It was inappropriate for certain countries to applaud Mr. de Klerk and advocate a slow-down in economic sanctions simply because some political prisoners had been released and beaches had been opened to Africans. If negotiations in South Africa were to succeed, it was necessary for the pillars of apartheid to be knocked down. Those pillars were the following: the 1909 South Africa Act, which had created racist colonialist South Africa and which the United Kingdom Parliament should repeal; the 1913 Land Act, which had robbed Africans of 87.5 per cent of the land; the 1936 Franchise Act, which had abolished the right of all Africans to vote; the 1954 Bantu Education Act, which had legalized inferior education for Africans; the

Population Registration Act, which had imposed racial classification; the 1983 Constitution, which had established the racist tricameral parliamentary system from which Africans were excluded and the Bantustan Act, which had created the so-called "homelands" thereby violating the territorial integrity of the country.

86. The racist régime still had to prove by deeds that it was serious about democratization. He recalled that, between September 1989 and January 1990, three massacres had led to the deaths of 69 Africans. The promised reduction in the military budget amounted to only 394 million pounds, out of 2.5 billion. Conscription of whites had been reduced to one year, but still remained in force. He wondered why the liberation movements with military wings (PAC and ANC) were being pressured to lay down their arms. Furthermore, there was a persistent rumour that Israel was helping South Africa to develop a nuclear capability - obviously against the whole of Africa, and in particular against the Front-Line States. He also drew attention to the discovery, several months previously, that South Africa was financing mercenary rule in the Comoros.

87. The visit of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa to a number of Eastern European countries, particularly Hungary and Romania, was very suspicious. Mr. Pik Botha was endeavouring to strengthen South African trade and circumvent economic sanctions, while ecouraging Eastern Europeans to go to South Africa as "immigrants". PAC hoped that the countries in Eastern Europe would not collaborate with those plans. A liberated Azania should not be expected to recognize such "immigrants" as citizens. Finally, he recalled that Mr. de Klerk had always been part and parcel of the apartheid machinery and doubted that the negotiations proposed by him could lead to genuine democratic change in South Africa, as history showed that oppressors had never relinquished political power voluntarily.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.